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THE RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
ARBITRAL AWARDS IN THE UNITED
STATES: DEFENSES TO
ARBITRABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
For almost forty years the traditional judicial antipathy1 to-
ward arbitration of commercial disputes has been steadily erod-
ing. This trend originated in 1947 with the enactment of the ini-
tial Federal Arbitration Act2 and culminated in the recent
Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.5 In that case the Court held that anti-
trust claims arising from international transactions were
arbitrable.4
One of the events that accelerated the courts' acceptance of
arbitration, especially in international transactions, was the
United States' accession to the United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(the Convention). 5 Although the United States participated in
the 1958 New York conference that established the Convention,
Congress did not ratify the Convention until 1970.6 The enact-
ment of legislation to implement the Convention reflected a con-
scious effort by the United States to foster international trade
by ensuring the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate inter-
national disputes.
The contours of the Convention have yet to be precisely de-
fined. Even now, for example, the federal judiciary is in the pro-
1. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1241-43 (1985); Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
2. Pub. L. No. 282, 61 Stat. 669 (1947)(codifed at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1982)).
3. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
4. Id. at 3358-61. This case is discussed in detail infra notes 85-141 and accompany-
ing text.
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1982).
6. Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970).
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cess of determining in which situations an arbitration clause in
an international agreement will not be enforced. These determi-
nations are extremely important because the courts of a con-
tracting state can withhold from arbitration only those issues
not capable of settlement by arbitration. Further, recognition
and enforcement of the award can be refused if the recognition
would violate the public policy of the country where enforce-
ment is sought.'
Domestic law is, of course, the yardstick for measuring the
arbitrability of a specific issue.8 In the United States a particu-
larly troubling area has been the arbitrability of violations of se-
curities laws' and antitrust laws.10 The question of whether stat-
utorily created rights can be submitted to international
arbitration has presented to the federal judiciary complex issues
of competing public policy concerns.
The antitrust area has been an especially problematical one,
but the Supreme Court recently held that antitrust issues were
indeed capable of arbitration in an international setting." Be-
yond the evolving judicial trend favoring arbitration, as repre-
sented by Mitsubishi, the judicially created dichotomy between
domestic and international arbitration agreements has created
an unsettling inconsistency in antitrust law. The practical result
of the Mitsubishi decision reflects the pragmatic attitude courts
seem to have taken toward international arbitration.1
2
7. See infra subpart III(B).
8. See Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3360.
9. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506 (1974). These two cases are discussed infra notes 48-73.
10. See Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
11. Id. at 3358-61.
12. Cf. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Oil Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). A similar distinction between domestic and interna-
tional parties is made in the area of bankruptcy law. In Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copol Co.,
517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975), the court of appeals held that the automatic stay of bank-
ruptcy did not preclude a foreign entity from continuing with an arbitration procedure
begun before the debtor (Fotochrome) filed the petition in bankruptcy. The court relied
on Scherk, 417 U.S. 506 (1974), and found that the treaty obligation under the Conven-
tion superseded the Bankruptcy Code. The court conceded that domestic claimants
might be at a disadvantage because foreign litigants would not be stayed, but allowed
Copol (the foreign litigant) to enforce its award. 417 F.2d at 519-20.
720 [Vol. 37
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II. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION
A. The Federal Act
The original Federal Arbitration Act (the Act) "estab-
lishe[d] by statute the desirability of arbitration as an alterna-
tive to the complications of litigation."'13 The Act's narrow scope,
however, seriously undercut its effectiveness. As one example,
the Act specifically excepted employment contracts from the
ambit of its coverage. 14 Additionally, the Act lacked any stream-
lined procedure for the enforcement of awards. Arbitration
agreements were required to specify the court in which an order
confirming the award could be made,15 and a successful foreign
party was forced to bring a common-law action on the award,
alleging an independent basis of jurisdiction such as diversity of
citizenship.16
By far the most serious defect in the original Act was the
problem of reciprocity. Because the United States was not ini-
tially a signatory to any agreement concerning the recognition
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, American parties
faced significant problems in enforcing awards in foreign coun-
tries.17 Thus, in international transactions, the Act presented
problems for parties both in the United States and abroad.
These problems contributed to a change in United States
policy toward the procedure for recognition and enforcement of
arbitrable awards. This change was reflected in the United
States' participation in the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, al-
though Congress did not accede to the Convention at its incep-
tion in 1958.18 In fact, it was not until 1970 that the United
13. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953). See also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
14. Specifically, the Act excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad em-
ployees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
15. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982).
16. Cf. M. DoMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 361 (1968).
17. See Domke, American Arbitral Awards: Enforcement in Foreign Countries,
1965 U. ILL. L.F. 399, 400-01.
18. See Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention
1986] 721
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States finally acceded to the Convention by adding an entirely
new chapter to the Federal Arbitration Act.
The 1970 amendment to the Act, Chapter II,1 eliminated
some of the practical impediments to enforcement of foreign
awards in the United States, particularly the reciprocity
problems. As a result, although troubling issues remain regard-
ing the Convention and its implementing legislation, the Con-
vention has succeeded in bringing increased certainty and pre-
dictability to international commercial transactions.
Chapter II also clarified and simplified the procedure for en-
forcing arbitration agreements and awards. The new chapter
identifies which agreements and parties are covered under the
Act.20 In addition, the United States district courts now have
original jurisdiction over proceedings under the Convention 21 so
that litigants need not plead diversity to establish an indepen-
dent basis for jurisdiction.2 Chapter II also resolves a number of
other procedural issues.23
Under the Act a court with jurisdiction now has the power,
and the obligation, to order an arbitration reference in accor-
dance with the agreement of the parties, whether within or with-
out the United States.2 4 Although the courts retain some discre-
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049,
1059-60, 1074-76 (1961).
19. Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970)(codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982)).
See S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1968); S. REP. No. 702, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 9-10 (1970).
20. Only agreements under the Convention are governed by the procedural provi-
sions of Chapter II domestic litigants are relegated to Chapter I. In addition, only com-
mercial relationships are subject to the Act's provisions at all. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1986).
Thus, only commercial transactions involving parties of U.S. citizenship and foreign par-
ties may avail themselves of the Act. It was thought that exempting domestic litigants
would benefit foreign commerce and prevent the effecting of any change in state law
through the supremacy clause. See S. REP. No. 702, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1970). See
also U.C.C. § 1-105 (1977).
21. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1982).
22. See S. REP. No. 702, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970).
23. 9 U.S.C. § 204 (1982) provides, inter alia, that venue is proper in the district
where the parties agree to arbitrate their dispute. In addition, 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1982)
provides for a clear right to remove a case under the Act to federal court. The original
Act contained no specific provision governing removal to the federal courts. In Prima
Point Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), the Supreme Court held
that arbitration agreements concerning interstate and foreign commerce were within the
bailiwick of federal law. Id. at 405-07. Section 205 of the amended Act codified this rule.
24. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1982).
[Vol. 37
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tion over the manner of exercising this power, a district court
would rarely require that arbitration take place in the United
States rather than in the location agreed upon by the parties.25
The Act also provides a three-year statute of limitations to bring
an action to enforce an award 26 and directs that the Convention
control the grounds upon which a refusal to enforce or a deferral
of an award can be made. In the event of a conflict between the
Convention and Chapter I of the Federal Arbitration Act, the
Convention shall control.2 8 Thus, it is the Convention itself that
limits the obligation to recognize and enforce arbitration agree-
ments and awards.
B. The Convention"
The Convention applies to all "awards made in the territory
of a State other than the State where the recognition and en-
forcement of such awards are sought" and to awards "not con-
sidered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition
and enforcement is sought."'30 The Convention, thus, establishes
a distinction between "domestic" awards and all other awards.
Article 1(3) permits a signatory nation to limit the applicability
of the Convention, "on the basis of reciprocity," to awards made
in another contracting state and to disputes arising from com-
mercial relationships.
1
Article II provides bases for challenging a reference to arbi-
tration. Article II(1) of the Convention requires the contracting
state to refer arbitration agreements if they are in writing32 and
the subject matter of the dispute is "capable of settlement by
arbitration. 3 3 Thus, a litigant wishing to avoid enforcement of
25. See H. REP. No. 1181, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970).
26. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1982). See also S. REP. No. 702, supra note 22, at 8.
27. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1982).
28. Id. § 208 (1982).
29. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1970). For the text of
selected articles of the Convention, see the appendix.
30. Art. I(1), 21 U.S.T. at 2519. Art. 1(2) provides that awards made by permanent
arbitral bodies are included in the definition of awards under the Convention. Id.
31. Art. I(3), id. A number of signatory nations have made both of these express
declarations. See id. at 2561-66.
32. Id. at 2519.
33. Id.
1986]
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the agreement's arbitration clause can assert the defense that
under the domestic law of the state in which reference to arbi-
tration is sought the subject matter of the dispute is not capable
of settlement by arbitration. In addition, article 11(3) provides
that arbitration is not required if a court in the state where ref-
erence is sought determines that the agreement is "null and
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. '34 This condi-
tion permits a litigant to raise a defense based, for example, on
fraud in the inducement, illegality, or other matters of public
policy. This provision also gives rise to the defense of waiver.
Article III of the Convention requires all signatory nations
to recognize foreign arbitral awards. 5 Each nation has discretion
to determine the procedures to be used in enforcing the awards,
but the Convention stipulates that foreign awards should not be
discriminated against in favor of domestic awards.3
The enforcement of arbitration awards is subject to a num-
ber of defenses. Article V provides the losing party in arbitration
with seven grounds on which to attack the award's validity.
3 7
Five of these defenses are mechanical in nature and can be re-
solved with a minimum of litigation at the enforcement stage.
These basic defenses are (1) that the arbitration agreement was
invalid, either under the law to which the parties subjected it or
under the law of the country where the award was made;3" (2)
that the aggrieved party lacked notice and the opportunity to be
heard;39 (3) that one party did not agree to submit a particular
issue to arbitration; 0 (4) that the arbitral procedure or the com-
position of the arbitral authority was improper;4 and (5) that
the award was suspended or is not yet binding.
42
34. Id.
35. Art. III, id.
36. Id. The specific documentation required to prove the foreign award is set out in
art. IV of the Convention. Id. at 2519-20. If the art. IV requirements are satisfied, the
burden of proof then shifts to the party against whom enforcement is sought to show the
invalidity of the award under one of the grounds listed in art. V. See Art. V, id. at 2520.
37. Id. at 2520.
38. Art. V(1)(a), id. Art. VI authorizes a temporary stay, if adequate security is
given, during the period the award is under attack in the country where it was made. Id.
39. Art. V(1)(b), id.
40. Art. V(1)(c), id. The parts of the award that the parties agreed to submit to
arbitration may still be enforced if severable from the rest of the award. Art. V(1)(c), id.
41. Art. V(1)(d), id.
42. Art. V(1)(e), id.
[Vol. 37
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Article V also provides for two additional enforcement de-
fenses that have created more troublesome issues for the courts.
The first of these is almost identical to the subject matter de-
fense to arbitration reference established by article II(1). If a
court or other competent authority in the country where en-
forcement is sought determines that the subject matter was "not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of that
country," recognition of the award may be refused.43 Under the
second defense, if recognition would violate that nation's public
policy, it can also be refused.44 This second defense will, in many
circumstances, function like the inoperability defense to arbitra-
tion reference created under article 11(3).
Finally, article XIV provides that a signatory nation can
bind other signatories "only to the extent that it is itself bound
to apply the Convention.45 This language, together with the reci-
procity language in article I,46 provides a defense based on lack
of reciprocity.
III. THE DEFENSES IN THE UNITED STATES
As a practical matter, the only serious litigation arising from
the incorporation of the Convention is in the area of defenses to
arbitration, either against the ordering of a reference to arbitra-
tion in accordance with the parties' agreement or against en-
forcement of a foreign arbitral award. In both areas the central
issue is the application of the two defenses discussed above: the
public policy and subject matter defenses. The primary focus of
this Note, therefore, is on these defenses. A brief discussion will
also be provided of the reciprocity and waiver defenses.
As a rule, each defense may be raised at either of two points
in the arbitration process. The first is when an adverse party
brings an action to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbi-
43. Art. V(2)(a), id. This defense differs from the subject matter defense to arbitra-
tion reference because of the additional phrase "under the law of that country." A liti-
gant challenging a reference could argue that arts. H(1) and V(2)(b) should be read to-
gether so that the art. V(2)(b) standard-subject matter not capable of settlement under
domestic law-should also govern the art. 11(1) defense. See infra text accompanying
note 137.
44. Art. V(2)(b), id.
45. Id. at 2522.
46. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
1986]
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tration Act; the second is at the enforcement stage of the pro-
cess. Differences may arise, however, both conceptually and
practically, depending on the stage at which the defense is
raised. To facilitate a discussion of the distinctions between as-
serting a successful defense vel non at the two stages, the con-
tours of the substantive defenses are set out first.
A. The Public Policy and Subject Matter Defenses
The ultimate inquiry of whether a dispute will be referred
to arbitration or whether the foreign award will be enforced is a
question of public policy.47 Since the amenabilty of an issue to
arbitration is generally determined by public policy considera-
tions, the subject matter and public policy defenses are largely
interchangeable. As a result, both the courts, and this Note,
treat them as one defense.
1. Actions Brought Pursuant to Securities Laws
Actions brought pursuant to statutory rights created by the
Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act)48 are not arbitrable.49 In
Wilko v. Swan,50 the plaintiff brought an action against a securi-
ties brokerage firm pursuant to section 12(2) of the 1933 Act 1
and alleged that the defendant induced him to purchase stock
through false representations.2 The defendants moved to stay
the action pursuant to the original Federal Arbitration Act."3
The district court denied the motion, but the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, reversed and held that pro-
spective agreements to arbitrate securities disputes were not
prohibited by the 1933 Act."4 The United States Supreme Court,
however, reversed the Second Circuit.
The Supreme Court found that, although the Federal Arbi-
47. Cf. Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982).
49. Causes of action implied under the 1934 Act may suffer a different fate. See
infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
50. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982)
52. 346 U.S. at 428-29.
53. Pub. L. No. 282, § 3, 61 Stat. 669, 670.
54. 346 U.S. at 429-30. See also Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
rev'd, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
[Vol. 37
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tration Act evidenced a congressional policy favoring arbitration,
section 14 of the 1933 Act55 prohibited the arbitration of dis-
putes arising under the 1933 Act. The Court held that the arbi-
tration agreement was a "stipulation" waiving compliance with a
provision of the 1933 Act and, therefore, violated section 14 of
that Act.5 6 In the Court's view, section 14 prohibited the waiver
of "the right to select the judicial forum' 57 and must have been
intended to apply to waiver of the right to judicial trial and
review.58
The Court in Wilko recognized that the Federal Arbitration
Act and the Securities Act of 1933, as well as the policies under-
lying each, were in conflict. The Court held, however, that agree-
ments to arbitrate securities disputes were void because the ar-
bitration clause restricted access to a judicial forum, contrary to
the intent of Congress in passing the 1933 Act.5 9
When confronted with an international dispute, the Su-
preme Court again balanced the policies behind the two acts,
but reached a contrary conclusion. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co.,60 the Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause be-
tween an American company and a German citizen was valid
even though the plaintiff, an American company, had brought an
action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the 1934 Act).6 1
In Scherk the plaintiff, Alberto-Culver, had purchased the
defendant's business enterprises along with all the rights those
enterprises held to trademarks in certain cosmetic goods. The
contract of sale contained a number of express warranties by the
defendant seller that he possessed the sole and unencumbered
rights to the trademarks. The agreement also contained an arbi-
tration clause that purported to cover "any controversy" arising
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77(2) (1982).
56. Section 14 provides:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the
rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.
15 U.S.C § 77n (1982).
57. 346 U.S. at 434-35.
58. Id. at 437.
59. Id. at 438.
60. 417 U.S. 506 (1971).
61. Id. at 519-21. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
78(a)-78kk (1982). Section 10(b) of the Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
1986]
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out of the agreement and specified that arbitration would take
place in Paris under the rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce. The agreement also provided, however, that resolu-
tion of any dispute was to be governed by the law of Illinois, the
plaintiff's principal place of business.6 2
After discovering that the trademarks in question were
heavily encumbered, Alberto-Culver tendered the property back
to the defendant and offered to rescind the contract. When
Scherk refused, Alberto-Culver brought an action in a federal
district court in Illinois. The complaint alleged that Scherk's
misrepresentations of the trademarks' status violated section
10(b) of the 1934 Act. 3 The district court, relying on Wilko v.
Swan, denied Scherk's motion to dismiss and enjoined him from
proceeding with arbitration in Paris. The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision,64 but the United
States Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court distinguished the facts of Wilko and
held its reasoning inapplicable to the dispute at issue. First, the
Court asserted that the plaintiff's theory rested not on any spe-
cial statutory right, as was the case in Wilko, but only on the
judicially created cause of action under section 10(b) of the 1934
Act. 5 Second, the Court characterized the agreement in Scherk
as a "truly international" one, which required consideration of
significantly different policies than had been applied in Wilko. 66
The Court found that the overwhelming policy favoring arbitra-
tion was determinative: "A parochial refusal by the courts of one
country to enforce an international arbitration agreement would
not only frustrate [the purposes of certainty and order in inter-
national dispute resolution], but would invite unseemly and mu-
tually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical liti-
gation advantages.
'67
Finally, the Court characterized the arbitration clause as "a
62. 417 U.S. at 508.
63. Id. at 509.
64. Id. at 510.
65. Id. at 513-14.
66. Id. at 515-16.
67. Id. at 516-17. The Court also found Wilko inapposite because in the interna-
tional context a foreign adversary could block a United States litigant from access to the
courts by speedy resort to a foreign court. Thus, the danger of waiver does not seem as
great. Id. at 518.
[Vol. 37
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specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only
the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving
the suit." As a result, the Court held that the agreement should
be respected and enforced.
6 8
Justice Douglas took the majority to task for failing to pro-
vide any substantial analysis of the case in accordance with
Wilko. Specifically, he argued that the majority failed to con-
sider whether securities were involved in Scherk or whether sec-
tion 10(b) was violated. 9 Further, Justice Douglas found no rea-
son that the "'international contract' talisman"70  should
somehow dilute the protection offered American investors. Fi-
nally, Justice Douglas noted that foreign entities could take ad-
vantage of this international exception to the securities law and
require aggrieved American investors to face the uncertainty of
foreign arbitration, if they could even afford to avail themselves
of that remedy.7
1
Although the Scherk majority made only brief mention of
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, the Court clearly believed its decision was con-
sistent with the congressional intent in acceding to that treaty.7 2
The Scherk decision can be construed as a logical step in the
evolving judicial trend favoring arbitration, especially in interna-
tional disputes in which concerns for reciprocity and retaliation
support recognition and enforcement. In Wilko no such counter-
vailing concerns were present. Instead, the issue confronting the
Court was one of conflicting congressional policies. As a result,
the Court encountered little difficulty in asserting the priority of
68. Id. at 519-20. See also id. at 514. In this analysis the Court relied heavily on The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Oil Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), in which the Court concluded
that a forum selection clause "should control absent a strong showing that it should be
set aside." Id. at 15. In Bremen the contract provided that all disputes arising under the
contract take place in the High Court in London. Finding no infirmities in the agree-
ment, the Court enforced the clause.
69. 417 U.S. at 525. Douglas' dissent focused in part on the definitional aspects of
the case, which the majority overlooked.
70. Id. at 529.
71. Id. at 533. This final criticism of the Scherk opinion raises an interesting anti-
trust question that will be examined later: whether a foreign entity can protect itself
from liability under the securities or antitrust laws of the United States merely through
the use of an arbitration clause in its agreement with a United States entity? The Scherk
opinion suggests an affirmative answer to this question. This issue will be discussed in
subpart III(A)(2).
72. Id. at 520 n. 15.
1986]
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the securities laws over the arbitration clause.
In Scherk, however, the Court could have held that viola-
tions of the securities laws were not issues capable of settlement
by arbitration, despite the substantial international policy con-
cerns on which it relied. 73 Article II(1) of the Convention, when
read in conjunction with article V(2)(b), would surely have pro-
vided a sufficient basis for such a conclusion. That the Court
declined to reach this result reflects a pragmatic attitude toward
international arbitration. Although the international policy con-
cerns were substantial, the Court could have decided the other
way.
Recent district court cases have added an interesting wrin-
kle to the analysis of Wilko and Scherk. In Land v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 4 for example, a district court in Virginia found
that implied causes of action under the 1934 Act were capable of
arbitration, at least under some circumstances. The court, rely-
ing upon the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, con-
cluded that when the implied cause of action is intimately re-
lated to an arbitrable state claim, no benefit would accrue from
severing the claims. As a result, the court held that the implied
cause of action in that case, which arose under section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act, should be submitted to arbitration.75 This decision
arguably cuts against the Scherk Court's emphasis on the impor-
tance of international obligations and comity. An argument
could be made, however, based on the distinction made in
Scherk,7e that only statutory claims, and not implied causes of
action, should be immune from arbitration.77
The Supreme Court opened the door for the Land court's
treatment of related claims in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
73. It should be noted that Scherk was a 5-4 decision.
74. 617 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Va. 1985).
75. Id. at 54. See also Jarvis v.-Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1146 (D.
Vt. 1985); Finn v. Davis, 610 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Green v. Shearson Lehman/
Am. Express, Inc., No. 85-1368 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 10, 1985). But see Rojas Caranon v.
Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 612 F. Supp. 996 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
76. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
77. After Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346
(1985), it would seem that to preserve this immunity, the statute would have to contain a
prohibition of the waiver of a judicial forum similar to the one in Wilko. In addition, the
continued validity of the distinction between statutory and implied causes of action now
appears uncertain. See Finn v. Davis, 610 F. Supp. 1079, 1082-83 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (hold-
ing that a statutory claim under RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-60 (1982), was arbitrable).
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Byrd.7 8 In Byrd the Court held that state law causes of action
must be submitted to arbitration even if the state law issues
were intertwined with federal claims under the 1934 Act.7" In so
doing, the Court noted the strong Congressional policy in favor
of arbitration. The district courts have read Byrd to support the
conclusion that implied causes of action under the 1934 Act
should be submitted to arbitration, at least when closely con-
nected with state causes of action.s0 Justice White, concurring in
Byrd, explicitly advanced this position on the ground that the
language in the 1933 Act, which barred arbitration in Wilko, was
"literally inapplicable"'" to actions brought under the 1934 Act.
Byrd and its progeny seem to have narrowed the scope of
securities law issues that cannot be subject to arbitration. Al-
though Justice White's concurrence expressly supported the
arbitrability of causes of action implied under the 1934 Act, the
majority refused to go that far because the question was not
before the Court.8 2 Even limited to its disposition of the state
law issues, however, Byrd is indicative of the continuing trend
toward the judicial recognition of agreements to arbitrate
disputes.
2. Antitrust Actions
As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed,
"The public policy in favor of international arbitration is strong.
. . . [and] the 'public policy' limitation on the Convention is to
be construed narrowly to be applied only where enforcement
would violate the forum state's most basic notions of morality
and justice. 's3 This policy, however, is in direct conflict with the
purposes of the remedial provisions of the antitrust laws.s4 Mit-
78. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
79. Id. at 1241.
80. See cases cited supra notes 74-75.
81. 105 S. Ct. at 1244.
82. Id. at 1240 n. 1.
83. Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1971); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. So-
ciete Generale De L'Institustrie Du Papier, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); Laminoirs-
Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
84. See Judice's Sunshine Pontiac, Inc. v. General Motors, 418 F. Supp. 1212
(D.N.J. 1976). See also Annot., 3 A.L.R. FED. 918 (1970).
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subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth5 represents
the Supreme Court's effort to balance these two policies. Be-
cause of its importance in the area of international arbitration,
the Mitsubishi decision will be discussed in some detail.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. was a Japanese corporation with
its principal place of business in Japan. In 1970 Mitsubishi en-
tered into a joint venture with Chrysler International, S.A., to
sell certain vehicles made by Mitsubishi through Chrysler deal-
ers outside the United States. Soler, a Puerto Rican corporation,
became a Chrysler dealer in 1979 when it entered into separate
distributor and sales agreements with Chrysler and Mitsubishi.
Both sales agreements contained an arbitration clause that pro-
vided: "All disputes . . . in relation to . . .[the sales agreement]
.. .or for breach thereof. . . shall be finally settled by arbitra-
tion in Japan.
'8 6
During 1981 Soler found it difficult to sell cars and decided
it would be more profitable to "transship" cars from Puerto Rico
to other markets. Mitsubishi and Chrysler, however, refused to
assent to this proposal.8 7 Mitsubishi eventually withheld ship-
ment of vehicles to Soler, and in February 1982 Soler disclaimed
responsibility for the vehicles. On March 15, 1982, Mitsubishi
brought suit against Soler in federal district court in Puerto
Rico for breach of the sales procedure agreement and petitioned
for an order compelling arbitration pursuant to the Federal Ar-
bitration Act and its incorporation of the Convention. 8
Soler denied the allegations and filed a counterclaim alleg-
ing violations of the Sherman Act, 9 the Automobile 'Dealers'
Day in Court Act, 0 the Puerto Rican Dealers' Act,91 and the Pu-
85. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985), modifying 723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983).
86. 723 F.2d at 157. The agreement provided:
All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between [Mitsubishi
and Soler] out of or in relation to Articles I-B through V of [the sales proce-
dure agreement] or for breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration in
Japan in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial
Arbitration Association.
Id. The sales procedure agreement was governed by Swiss law. Id. at 159 n. 3.
87. The two corporations refused to allow transshipment of the vehicles because
they were unsuitable for either the United States or Latin America markets and because
transshipment might possibly have interfered with voluntary import restraints by the
Japanese. 105 S. Ct. at 3349 n. 1.
88. 723 F.2d at 157.
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
90. 15 U.S. §§ 1221-25 (1982).
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erto Rican antitrust and unfair competition statute.92 The dis-
trict court ordered arbitration of the counterclaims93 along with
Mitsubishi's claims against Soler. Soler appealed this order on
two separate grounds: first, that the statutory counterclaims
were beyond the scope of the arbitration clause; and second,
that, in any event, the Sherman Act claims were nonarbitrable
as a matter of law.
94
The First Circuit Court of Appeals readily concluded that
the arbitration clause was valid9 5 and that Soler's counterclaims
were, in large part, within the scope of the clause.9" The arbi-
trability of the antitrust claims, however, presented the court
with a more complex issue.
To resolve this issue, the court considered the following
three interrelated issues: (1) whether the antitrust exception to
domestic arbitration applied to international disputes and com-
ported with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards; (2) whether the Scherk doc-
trine proscribed the application of the antitrust exception; and
(3) whether the district court should sever the action if the anti-
trust claims were held nonarbitrable. 7
The court first noted that in the case of domestic contracts
the unanimous judicial rule was that antitrust issues were not
arbitrable.98 As support for this proposition, the court cited
American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire Co.99 and
the four reasons that the Second Circuit had put forth in that
case. First, antitrust law is vital to a free economy and private
suits help to enforce this law; second, if arbitration clauses were
enforceable, parties might employ contracts of adhesion to deny
claimants a forum; third, the arbitration procedure is ill-
equipped to handle the complexities of antitrust law; and fourth,
91. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 278 (1978).
92. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10 § 257 (1978).
93. The district court ordered arbitration of all the counterclaims except for two
and a portion of a third. See 105 S. Ct. at 3351 & n. 7.
94. 723 F.2d at 158.
95. Id. at 158-59.
96. Id. at 159-61. The court noted that in interpreting the arbitration clause, all
doubt was to be resolved in favor of arbitration. Id. at 159.
97. Id. at 162.
98. See Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); American Safety Equip. Corp. v.
J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); Annot., 3 A.L.R. FAD. 918 (1970).
99. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
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antitrust decisions are too important to entrust to
businessmen. 100
The court also dismissed the argument that enforcement of
United States antitrust laws in the international community
would be viewed as "parochial" by other nations. As the court
noted, both the European Economic Community, under the
treaty of Rome, and the Federal Republic of Germany have sim-
ilar antitrust provisions. 1 1 The court then considered what it
called "the obverse question": whether any policy considerations
supported extension of the nonarbitrability rule to international
transactions. The court concluded that because of the increasing
international nature of business transactions, the nonarbi-
trability rule, if not extended, would be limited "to the most mi-
nor and insignificant of business dealings.' 0 2 Having deter-
mined that the antitrust exception to arbitrability was still
viable, even in an international context, the court turned its at-
tention to the text of the Convention.
After an extensive analysis of articles II and V of the Con-
vention,10 3 the court concluded that "an agreement to arbitrate
antitrust issues is not 'an agreement within the meaning of' Arti-
cle 11(3) of the Convention because such an agreement does not
concern a 'subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration,'
as required in Article II(1). ' '104 Thus, any award would be unen-
forceable under article V(2)(a). 105
The court of appeals recognized that the holding in Scherk
posed a "considerable roadblock" to this analysis, 06 but justified
100. 723 F.2d at 162 (citing American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826-27).
101. Id. at 163. The court was attempting to distinguish Mitsubishi from The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Oil Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), and Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506 (1974). As further support for its conclusion, the court quoted Douglas'
dissent regarding the ability of foreign entities to insulate themselves from antitrust lia-
bility through the use of arbitration clauses.
102. Id. at 163.
103. Id. at 164-66
104. Id. at 166.
105. The court noted that several commentators had predicted this construction,
though not with unanimous approval. Id. at 165-66. See Aksen, American Arbitration
Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U.L.R. 1, 8
(1971); McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards in the United States, 2 J. MA&- L. & Com. 735, 753 n. 83 (1971); Quigley,
supra note 18, at 1064.
106. 723 F.2d at 166.
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its conclusion by distinguishing the policies and facts of Scherk.
While in both Wilko and Scherk the Court had found that the
policy goal behind the securities laws was the protection of in-
vestors, the purpose of the antitrust laws, according to the Mit-
subishi court, was to protect competition and the public as a
whole. This distinction was significant enough to mandate a dif-
ferent result. The court of appeals found that a Scherk-type bal-
ancing would be unreasonable and held that the antitrust claims
at issue were indeed nonarbitrable.
10 7
Finally, the court remanded the case to the district court to
consider the possibility of severing the antitrust issues from the
other claims in the case. This determination was left to the dis-
cretion of the trial court.
10 8
The finding by the court of appeals that the antitrust claims
were indeed nonarbitrable raises the most difficult issues in the
opinion. Reliance on American Safety and upon the construc-
tion of the Convention were the cornerstones of the court's anal-
ysis. The Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision, reversed the judg-
ment of the court of appeals on the antitrust issues and affirmed
the judgment on the other issues. 0 9 In doing so, the majority
clearly rejected the analysis employed by the court of appeals.
The Court began with a careful examination of the prior
proceedings and narrowed the issue to "whether an American
Court should enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by
arbitration when that agreement arises from an international
transaction.""' 0
Soler's first argument was that the statutory counterclaims
raised in its answer were not within the scope of the arbitration
agreement. The Court disagreed, however, and found that the
Federal Arbitration Act, as amended, did not warrant a conclu-
sive presumption against arbitration of statutory claims."' In-
deed, the Court found that the Act manifested a liberal Congres-
107. Id. at 168-69.
108. Id. at 169.
109. 105 S. Ct. at 3361 (Justice Powell not participating).
110. Id. at 3353. The Court only addressed the federal antitrust issues; the antitrust
issues under Puerto Rican law were subsumed into federal law. In addition, because
Soler did not preserve the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act issues, they were not
addressed. Id. at 3352 nn. 10 & 11.
111. Id. at 3353.
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sional policy in favor of arbitration agreements.11 2
The Court observed, however, that not all statutory claims
would be subject to the Act. The Court stated that the text of a
statute or its legislative history could evidence a congressional
policy against arbitration of claims brought under that statute.
As an example of such a case, the Court cited Wilko v. Swan'
13
in which the Court had recognized a congressional policy to ex-
cept certain statutory securities claims from arbitration.
1 1 4
The Court then construed the arbitration clause at issue
and determined that Soler's statutory Sherman Act counter-
claims were within its scope. On this issue the Court affirmed
the analysis that the court of appeals had employed." 5
Having found that the statutory counterclaims were within
the scope of the arbitration clause, the Court next considered
whether the antitrust issues were nonarbitrable despite Soler's
prior agreement to arbitration. The Court determined that these
issues were arbitrable:
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect
for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system
for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we
enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary
result would be forthcoming in a domestic context. 16
The Court thus recognized the explicit dichotomy that had
originated in Scherk.
In addition, the Court relied on Scherk and The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Oil Co.1 7 to establish two propositions: first,
that forum-selection clauses are acceptable in international
transactions and, second, that "'an agreement to arbitrate...
is a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not
only the situs of the suit but also the procedure to be used in
112. Id. at 3353 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1 (1983)).
113. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
114. The Court also noted that nothing in the Act prevents a party from specifically
excluding certain claims from the operation of the arbitration agreement. 105 S. Ct. at
3355 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
115. 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
116. Id. (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
117. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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resolving the dispute.' """ The Court also cited the accession to
the Convention to support, with special force, the federal policy
in favor of arbitration, especially in international contracts.
The Court next turned its attention to the American
Safety" 9 doctrine, under which agreements to arbitrate anti-
trust claims in domestic transactions are unenforceable. The
Court proceeded to examine that doctrine's viability in the con-
text of an international transaction.
The Court began its inquiry by rejecting the argument that
the arbitration clause would be tainted by the unequal bargain-
ing power of the parties. The Court concluded that without an
affirmative showing that an arbitration clause is affected by une-
qual bargaining power or inequitable conduct or that it effec-
tively denies the objecting party "his day in court," the agree-
ment should not be invalidated as a contract of adhesion. 120
The Court similarly dismissed the concern expressed in
American Safety that the issues involved in an antitrust suit
were too complex for the arbitral process. The Court observed
that courts which have adopted the American Safety rule for
prospective agreements allow the reference of antitrust cases to
arbitration after the dispute has arisen. 2' In addition, the com-
plexities of antitrust law could easily be handled if experts were
enlisted to assist in the arbitration process.' 22
The Court next rejected yet another proposition of the
American Safety court-that arbitrators would be innately hos-
tile to laws aimed at imposing constraints on business. The
Court declined to presume that impartial arbitrators could not
be found to conduct the procedure.
123
The Court then considered the "core of the American
Safety doctrine": the fundamental importance of antitrust laws
to the American form of capitalism and democracy. The Court
acknowledged the effectiveness of private civil suits as a tool for
118. 105 S. Ct. at 3356 (quoting Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519).
119. For a discussion of American Safety, see supra notes 98-100 and accompanying
text.
120. 105 S. Ct. at 3357.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3357-58.
123. Id. at 3358. The Court also noted that many other nations, including Japan,
have developed antitrust laws. Id. n. 18.
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enforcement of the antitrust laws, 24 but concluded that this
function did not compel the conclusion that private suits could
be brought only in American courts. First, the Court noted that
the treble damages provisions of the Sherman Act were intended
primarily to provide a remedy for individuals, not to police the
business community. The Court further observed that an injured
party is under no compulsion to bring a suit and needs no judi-
cial permission to settle an antitrust suit.125 Consequently, in in-
ternational disputes a litigant may prefer, and should be free to
choose, to resolve individual claims in an arbitral forum. Second,
the Court found no reason to assume that United States law
would not be applied when the arbitration agreement stipulated
its use. Therefore, the enforcement of an arbitration clause
would in no way deprive a litigant of a forum in which to vindi-
cate his statutory cause of action.
1 26
Finally, the Court noted that article V(2)(b) of the Conven-
tion allows a contracting state to refuse the recognition or en-
forcement of an award if it violates the public policy of that
state. With the barest inquiry, the Court reasoned, a reviewing
court could determine that the arbitral forum had not properly
considered the antitrust claims and could refuse enforcement.
1 27
Thus, the Court rejected the court of appeals' analysis of the
Convention language, which had equated the public policy issues
of enforcement with those of reference. Any subject matter
within the scope of an arbitration agreement must be referred to
arbitration unless Congress has expressly directed otherwise. Ac-
cession to the Convention precluded the recognition of any "ju-
dicially implied exception.' 2 Accordingly, the Court held that
the agreement was enforceable and required Soler to "honor its
124. Id. (citing American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826, in which the court noted the im-
portance of the "private attorney-general" who protects the public interest while seeking
damages).
125. In contrast, some causes of action require judicial permission for settlement.
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (shareholder derivative suits).
126. 105 S. Ct. at 3358-59.
127. The Court noted that the Japanese arbitration rules provided that a record of
the proceedings be made. Id. at 3358 n. 17.
128. Id. at 3360-61 n. 21. The Court agreed with the court of appeals that some
subjects were not "capable of settlement by arbitration," but disagreed on which branch
of the government should define these exceptions. The Supreme Court concluded that
Congress should expressly set out any exceptions to the Act. Id.
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bargain."129
Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall,1 30 attacked the majority's reasoning on two grounds.
First, he contended that the clause itself did not encompass the
statutory counterclaims. Second, he argued that Congress did
not intend that either section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act or
the Convention apply to antitrust claims.
In addressing the first issue, the dissent argued that because
Soler's counterclaim added a third party to the dispute, it added
a claim not encompassed by the arbitration agreement. The dis-
sent also found that the antitrust claims did not fall within the
language of the agreement. Justice Stevens disagreed with the
majority's view of the original Federal Arbitration Act. He as-
serted that nothing in the statute or in its legislative history sug-
gested that Congress intended to include statutory claims within
the purview of the Act.131 Thus, he maintained, a presumption
existed that the parties did not intend to include statutory
claims within the scope of the arbitration clause.132
The dissent then turned to the more important question:
whether the antitrust claims were arbitrable as a matter of
law.13 3 The dissent examined in detail the federal policy behind
the antitrust laws and the laws' importance to the public.134 The
dissent's primary concern was that since arbitral awards were
not reviewable except for manifest error, important decisions
were often left without review. 3 5 The dissent believed that a ju-
dicial hearing of the antitrust claim would be more in the public
interest than "muffling a grievance in the cloakroom of
arbitration.'
' 36
Finally, the dissent challenged the proposition that interna-
tional obligations compelled the majority's result. The dissent
129. Id. at 3361.
130. Justice Marshall joined the two other dissenters only in arguing that as a mat-
ter of law antitrust claims are not arbitrable. Id. at 3361.
131. Id. at 3364. This position is contrary to the majority's view that all claims are
included unless specifically excepted by Congress.
132. It should be noted that only Justices Stevens and Brennan joined this part of
the dissent. See supra note 130.
133. Id. at 3366.
134. Id. at 3367-70.
135. Id. at 3370. The dissent noted that in the United States arbitrators can compel
witnesses to attend, but that in Japan this procedure is unavailable. Id. at 3370 n. 31.
136. Id. at 3370.
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adopted the court of appeals' construction of the Convention
that articles II and V, when read together, clearly indicate that
courts need not honor agreements to arbitrate disputes that are
nonarbitrable under domestic law.13
The dissent also examined Wilko and Scherk and found
Mitsubishi clearly distinguishable from Scherk.138 In Mitsubishi
Soler's antitrust counterclaims, like the plaintiff's claims in
Wilko, would be governed by American law. In Scherk, on the
other hand, Alberto-Culver's stock purchase contract was gov-
erned by foreign rules of law and nonenforcement of the arbitra-
tion clause would have given rise to "a host of international con-
flict of laws problems."13 9 Justice Stevens found this distinction
relevant not only to the antitrust law claims, but also to the
claim based on the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, which
was enacted to equalize the bargaining power of automobile
manufacturers and dealers.140 The dissent concluded that these
interests would better be served if the dispute were resolved by
a jury trial rather than by arbitration.
1 4 '
C. Possible Consequences of Mitsubishi
The Supreme Court in Mitsubishi faced two divergent
paths: it could either follow Wilko and extend the American
Safety doctrine to international transactions or it could expand
upon Scherk and find that agreements to arbitrate in interna-
tional disputes can encompass antitrust claims. Although the
Court chose the latter, the majority's analysis of the Convention
and of the public policy exception's meaning still leaves some
troubling issues in this area.
The distinction between Scherk and Wilko, based on the
lack of a statutory cause of action, was not present in Mitsub-
ishi. As the dissent noted in Mitsubishi, the statutory antitrust
claims were intended to protect the public at large, not individ-
ual investors. Thus, a strong argument can be made that anti-
trust claims should have been held not "capable of settlement
137. Id. at 3371.
138. Id. at 3372-74.
139. Id. at 3373.
140. Id. at 3374.
141. Id. at 3374-75.
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by arbitration." The majority in Mitsubishi, however, did not
adopt this reasoning; instead, it focused on the more practical
concerns of international business transactions. Though unex-
pressed in the majority's opinion, one of the concerns in this
area is the impact of extraterritorial application of American an-
titrust laws. International response to this extraterritorial appli-
cation has often taken the form of defensive legislation limiting
the ability of regulatory entities in the United States to acquire
information on businesses overseas.
142
The dissents in both Scherk and Mitsubishi presented a
strong case in favor of a public policy exception to arbitration.
Justice Douglas, in Scherk, pointed out the very real possibility
that foreign entities could protect themselves from liability
under the United States' securities laws through the use of arbi-
tration clauses. 143 In addition, he noted that unequal bargaining
power could often be used to force an arbitration clause on the
weaker party.1
4 4
In Mitsubishi Justice Stevens raised these same concerns
and argued that they should apply with even greater force when
a litigant alleges violations of the antitrust laws, which were in-
tended to protect the public as a whole, not only individual in-
vestors. He also observed that the Automobile Dealers' Day in
Court Act was enacted specifically to equalize the disparate eco-
nomic power of automobile manufacturers and dealers. Foreign
entities could take advantage of arbitration to insulate them-
selves from this statutory liability, while domestic entities,
under the American Safety doctrine, could not.
This situation could be more of a problem in a different
context. What if the aggrieved party is a plaintiff alleging an in-
jury due not only to the actions of the entity with which he con-
tracted, but also to the actions of an unrelated third party? Mit-
subishi leaves this question unanswered.' 1  Logically the
reasoning in Mitsubishi should lead to the conclusion that the
142. See generally Petit & Styles, The International Response to the Extraterrito-
rial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 697 (1982).
143. Scherk, however, did not present this sort of situation.
144. 417 U.S. at 533.
145. Chrysler did not appeal the determination of the district court to retain juris-
diction because no agreement to arbitrate existed between Chrysler and Soler. 105 S. Ct.
at 3351 n. 7.
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contracting entity could enforce the agreement to arbitrate. 46
Because the Court distinguished between the grounds necessary
to prevent a reference to arbitration and those required to de-
feat enforcement of an award, the plaintiff in this situation is
left in an awkward position. Forced both to arbitrate his anti-
trust claims against the contracting party and litigate against
the third party, the plaintiff is faced with the very real possibil-
ity of inconsistent results.
In addition, the decision in Mitsubishi may have an adverse
effect on the extraterritorial reach of American antitrust laws.
Under the Convention a state must enforce an award made in
the territory of another contracting state unless one of the de-
fenses applies. Thus, an award made in Japan that disregarded
United States antitrust law issues could be enforced in the terri-
tory of another contracting state even if unenforceable in the
United States because of the Article V(2) defenses. The success-
ful party could then avoid the United States' public policy in-
quiry because it would be irrelevant to the enforcing state. The
unsuccessful litigant would indeed be hard pressed to argue that
violation of the United States' public policy should prevent the
award's enforcement in the territory of a third state. Although
this situation did not actually present a problem in Mitsubishi,
because the claimant was a local car dealer, it could easily arise
if the claimant were a multinational corporation based in the
United States. In that situation, there might be only one oppor-
tunity for an American court to consider the case, at the refer-
ence stage of the procedure. Thus, the regime in Mitsubishi
could seriously impair enforcement of the United States' anti-
trust laws in international transactions.
To remedy this problem, the United States' courts could at-
tempt to induce foreign arbitrators to apply American antitrust
law. Given the hostile reception to American antitrust laws
abroad, however, this expectation seems unrealistic. Thus, the
decision in Mitsubishi has limited the potential enforcement of
the antitrust laws through "private attorneys general.' ' 47 How
the Supreme Court might resolve these problems remains to be
seen.
The Mitsubishi majority's belief that Congress should pre-
146. Art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519.
147. See supra note 124.
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scribe those circumstances under which an arbitration agree-
ment should not be enforced 148 produces the salutary effect of
predictability in international arbitration for all the parties con-
cerned. Implied judicial exceptions, on the other hand, would
undercut this certainty and predictability. As the majority in
Mitsubishi noted, when parties wish to except certain matters
from the arbitration procedure, they can do so by agreement.
14
Mitsubishi, then, seems to represent a balance between the
practical exigencies of international business and the theoretical
doctrines underlying antitrust law in the United States. The
scales in this case tipped in favor of predictable international
dispute resolution.
Another question that remains in the wake of the Mitsub-
ishi decision is whether the exception to arbitration in Wilko
will enjoy continued vitality, especially in the context of an in-
ternational transaction. In dicta the majority seemed to indicate
that Wilko would indeed remain viable after Mitsubishi.50 The
Wilko exception will apply, however, only within the narrow
confines of the Wilko holding-when Congress has expressly
prohibited the waiver of the right to a judicial forum for a statu-
tory cause of action. Therefore, to avoid the rule in Mitsubishi, a
litigant must be able to point to specific language in the text of a
statute, or in its legislative history, that evidences a congres-
sional intent to prohibit the waiver of the right to a judicial fo-
rum for a cause of action based on the statute. Although Wilko
does retain some vitality, the scope of its exception to the gen-
eral rule of arbitrability has certainly been narrowed.
B. Reciprocity
The defense of reciprocity is based primarily on the explicit
declarations in the Convention.151 This right, however, is discre-
tionary and may be refused recognition by the enforcing state. 52
148. 105 S. Ct. at 3360-61 n. 21.
149. Id. at 3355. Of course, this statement ignores the dissents argument that these
clauses often arise in an adhesionary context.
150. See id.
151. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
152. Id. See also La Societe Nationale Pour La Recherche La Production, Le Trans-
port, La Transformation et La Commercialiscation Des Hydrocarbures v. Shaheen Natu-
ral Resources Co., 585 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Litigants have argued that because recognition in another con-
tracting state is limited to some degree, recognition in the
United States should also be limited. These arguments, however,
have met with little success.153 In addition, "the Convention's
mandate to refer parties to arbitration is not necessarily negated
because an arbitral award would be unenforceable under a for-
eign forum's law. ' '1
5
4
Thus, the reciprocity defense to reference, like the public
policy defense to reference, will be narrowly construed. Enforce-
ment can still be refused, but only if the party asserting the de-
fense can demonstrate a genuine lack of reciprocity in the state
where the award was made.
C. Waiver
Waiver of the arbitration clause is also available as a de-
fense to an arbitration reference. 155 In LT.A.D. Associates, Inc.
v. Podar Brothers, 56 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that "[a]rticle 11(3) contemplates the possibility of waiver of the
arbitration agreement by one or both of the parties. 15 7 I.T.A.D.
had argued that Podar Brothers waived the arbitration clause by
waiting nearly four years to move to compel arbitration pursu-
ant to the Federal Arbitration Act, and the district court agreed..
The court of appeals, however, reversed and held that while
waiver is recognized under the Convention, Podar's actions did
not amount to a waiver. The court stated that the mere passage
of time, without a showing of resulting prejudice, could not con-
stitute waiver. Since I.T.A.D. had not demonstrated that it had
suffered any prejudice, no waiver had occurred, and the court
ordered arbitration to be conducted.15 8
Waiver, therefore, will only be available under limited cir-
cumstances. It can occur when prejudice results to one party as
153. See Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio
1981), reh'g denied, 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
154. Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia Francese Di Assurazioni E Riassicuruzioni v.
Lauro, 555 F. Supp. 481, 485 (D.V.I. 1982), af'd, 712 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1983)(a quirk in
Italian procedural law might have made the award unenforceable).
155. The defense of waiver is derived from art. 11(3). See supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text.
156. 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981).
157. Id. at 77.
158. Id. at 76-77.
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a result of the other's actions or by mutual agreement. Like the
other defenses to arbitrability, waiver is to be narrowly
construed.
V. CONCLUSION
American courts that have considered the issue of arbi-
trability of an international dispute have focused their discus-
sions on amenability to reference under domestic law. Compet-
ing public policy concerns lay at the heart of the decisions in
this area, as the reasoning in Mitsubishi and Scherk well illus-
trate. The tension that has developed between theoretical con-
siderations of the policies behind the Sherman Act and the poli-
cies fostering international arbitration is evident from the
dissent in Mitsubishi. Nevertheless, the pragmatic considera-
tions of international comity and commerce prevailed in Mitsub-
ishi over theoretical consistency with domestic law.
This does not mean that the Mitsubishi decision was not
correct. The concerns expressed by the Mitsubishi majority are
valid, especially given the inexorable rise in international trade
and the interdependence of the world's developed economies.
Certainty in business disputes fosters growth in international
trade by reducing the risks and costs involved.
The decision in Mitsubishi, however, still leaves unanswered
questions concerning which issues raised by litigants will pre-
clude arbitration. The Mitsubishi majority severely undercut the
vitality of Wilko and left the impression that no claims, save
those within the narrow confines of Wilko, would be judged in-
capable of "settlement by arbitration" under the terms of the
Convention. This regime leaves potential claimants only one op-
tion-to attack the validity of the arbitral award at the enforce-
ment stage. A challenge at that stage could be difficult, particu-
larly when records of the arbitral proceedings are sparse. A due
process defense provides a final fall-back position,159 but only in
the most egregious cases would this argument succeed.
Although the decision in Mitsubishi clarifies some of the is-
sues involved in international arbitration, it leaves troubling
159. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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questions about the efficacy of the antitrust laws in international
transactions.
Dennis J. Connolly
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APPENDIX
SELECTED ARTICLES FROM THE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS 60
ARTICLE I
1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and
enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons,
whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domes-
tic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.
2. The term "arbitral awards" shall include not only awards made by arbitrators
appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the
parties have submitted.
3. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension
under article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will
apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the
territory of another Contracting State. It may also declare that it will apply the Conven-
tion only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not,
which are considered as commercial under the national law of the State making such
declaration.
ARTICLE H
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the
parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether con-
tractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or
an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or
telegrams.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect
of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at
the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the
said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
ARTIcLE I
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them
in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon,
under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed
substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or
enforcement or arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on
the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
ARIcLE IV
1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the preceding article,
the party applying for recognition and enforcement shall, at the time of the application,
supply:
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof;
160. June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (entered into force Dec. 29,
1970).
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(b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified copy thereof.
2. If the said award or agreement is not made in an official language of the country
in which the award is relied upon, the party applying for recognition and enforcement of
the award shall produce a translation of these documents into such language. The trans-
lation shall be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular
agent.
ARTICLE V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the
party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority
where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applica-
ble to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the laws of
the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable
to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submit-
ted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award
which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and en-
forced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, falling such agreement, was not in ac-
cordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award had not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,
that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the com-
petent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that-
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration
under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country.
ARTICLE VI
If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been made to a
competent authority referred to in article V(1)(e), the authority before which the award
is sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the
enforcement of the award and may also, on the application of the party claiming enforce-
ment of the award, order the other party to give suitable security.
ARTicLE XIV
A Contracting State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the present Convention
against other Contracting States except to the extent that it is itself bound to apply the
Convention.
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